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Abstract
Suppose two players meet each other in a repeated game where:
1. each uses a learning rule with the property that it is a calibrated
forecast of the others plays, and
2. each plays a best response to this forecast distribution.
Then, the limit point of the sequence of plays are Correlated Equilibria. In fact, for each Correlated equilibrium there is some calibrated
learning rule that the players can use which result in their playing this
correlated equilibrium in the limit. Thus, the statistical concept of calibration is strongly related to the game theoretic concept of correlated
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The concept of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) is so important to game theory
that an extensive literature devoted to its defense and advancement exists.
Even so, there are aspects of the Nash equilibrium concept that are puzzling.
One is why any player should assume that the other will play their Nash
equilibrium strategy? Aumann (1987) says: \This is particularly perplexing
when, as often happens, there are multiple equilibria; but it has considerable
force even when the equilibrium is unique."
One resolution is to argue that the assumption about an opponent's plays
are the outcome of some learning process (see for example Chapter 6 of Kreps
(1991a)). Learning is modeled as recurrent updating. Players choose a best
reply on the basis of their forecasts of their opponents future choices. Forecasts are described as a function of previous plays in the repeated game.
Much attention has focused on developing forecast rules by which a Nash
equilibrium (or its re nements) may be learned. Many rules have been proposed and convergence to Nash equilibrium has been established under certain conditions (see Skyrms 1990). For example, Fudenberg and Kreps (1991)
introduce the class of rules satisfying a property called `asymptotic myopic
bayes.' They prove that if convergence takes place, it does so to a NE. Notice that convergence is not guaranteed. In summarizing other approaches,
Kreps (1991b) points out, \in general convergence is not assured." This lack
of convergence serves to lessen the importance of NE and its re nements.
On the positive side Milgrom and Roberts (1991) have shown that any
learning rule that requires the player to make approximately best responses
consistent with their expectations, play tends towards the serially undominated set of strategies. They call such learning rules adaptive and prove that
3

if the sequence of plays converges to a NE (or correlated equilibrium) then
each players play is consistent with adaptive learning.
Learning, as we have described it, takes place at the level of the individual. An important class of learning models involve learning at the level
of populations (evolutionary models). Here the di erent strategies are represented by individuals in the population. In particular a mixed strategy
would be represented by assigning an appropriate fraction of the population
to each strategy. A pair of individuals is selected at random to play the game.
Individuals do not update their strategies but their numbers wax and wane
according to their average (suitably de ned) payo . Even in this environment convergence to a NE is not guaranteed. On the positive side, results
analogous to Milgrom and Roberts have been obtained by Samuelson and
Zheng (1992).
A second objection to NE is that it is inconsistent with the Bayesian perspective. A Bayesian player starts with a prior over what their opponent will
select and chooses a best response to that. To argue that Bayesians should
play the NE of the game is to insist that they each choose a particular prior.
Aumann (1987) has gone further and argued that the solution concept consistent with the Bayesian perspective is not NE but Correlated Equilibrium
(CE). Support for such a view can be found in Nau and McCardle (1990)
who characterize CE in terms of the no arbitrage condition so beloved by
Bayesians. Also, Kalai and Lehrer (1994) show that Bayesian players with
uncontradicted beliefs learn a correlated equilibrium.
In this note, we provide a direct link between the Bayesian beliefs of
players to the conclusion that they will play a CE. We do this by showing that
a CE can be `learned'. We do not particular a speci c learning rule, rather, we
restrict our attention to learning rules that possess an asymptotic property
4

called calibration. The key result is that if players use any forecasting rule
with the property of being calibrated, then, in repeated plays of the game,
the limit points of the sequence of plays are correlated equilibria.
The game theoretic importance of calibration follows from a theorem of
Dawid (1992). Given the Bayesians prior look at the forecasts generated by
the posterior. The sequences of future events on which this forecast will not
be calibrated, have measure zero. That is the Bayesian's prior assigns probability zero to such outcomes. Thus, under the common prior assumption, a
bayesian would expect all the other players to be using their posterior, and
hence to be calibrated. Now using our result that calibration implies correlated equilibria, and the common prior assumption shows that bayesians
expect that in the limit, they will be playing a correlated equilibrium. This
provides an alternative prove to Aumann's proof that the common prior assumption and rationality implies a correlated equilibrium. If the common
prior assumption holds then it is common knowledge that all players are calibrated. If the players use a Bayesian forecasting scheme that is calibrated,
then, by the above, in repeated plays of the game, the limit points of the
sequence of plays are correlated equilibria.
In the next section of this paper we introduce notation and provide a rigorous de nition of some of the terms used in the introduction. Subsequently
we state and prove the main result of our paper. For ease of exposition we
consider only the 2-person case. However, our results generalize easily to the
n-person case.1
1

See discussion after Theorem 3.

5

2 Notation and De nitions
For i = 1; 2, denote by S (i) the nite set of pure strategies of player i and
by ui(x; y) 2 < the payo to player i where x 2 S (1) and y 2 S (2). Let
m = jS (1)j and n = jS (2)j. A correlated strategy is a function h from a nite
probability space ? into S (1)  S (2), i.e., h = (h1; h2) is a random variable
whose values are pairs of strategies, one from S (1) and the other from S (2).
Note that if h is a correlated strategy, then ui(h1; h2), is a real valued random
variable.
So as to understand the de nition of a correlated equilibrium, imagine an
umpire who announces to both players what ? and h are. Chance chooses an
element g 2 ? and hands it to the umpire who computes h(g). The umpire
then reveals hi(g) to player i only and nothing more.

De nition: A correlated strategy h is called a correlated equilibrium if:
E ( u1(h1; h2) )  E ( u1((h1); h2) ) for all  : S (1) ! S (1);
and,

E ( u2(h1; h2) )  E ( u2(h1; (h2)) ) for all  : S (2) ! S (2);
Thus, a CE is achieved when no player can gain by deviating from the
umpire's recommendation, assuming the other player will not deviate either.
The deviations, are restricted to be functions  of hi because player i knows
only hi(g). For more on CE see Aumann (1974) and Aumann (1987).
We turn now to the notion of calibration. This is one of a number of
criteria used to evaluate the reliability of a probability forecast. It has been
argued by a number of writers (see Dawid (1982)) that calibration is an
6

appealing minimal condition that any respectable probability forecast should
satisfy. Dawid o ers the following intuitive de nition:
Suppose that, in a long (conceptually in nite) sequence of weather
forecasts, we look at all those days for which the forecast probability of precipitation was, say, close to some given value p and
(assuming these form an in nite sequence) determine the long
run proportion  of such days on which the forecast event (rain)
in fact occurred. The plot of  against p is termed the forecaster's
empirical calibration curve. If the curve is the diagonal  = p,
the forecaster may be termed well calibrated.2
To give the notion a formal de nition, suppose that player 1 is using
a forecasting scheme f . The output of f in round t of play is an n-tuple
f (t) = fp1 (t); : : :; pn(t)g where pj (t) is the forecasted probability that player
2 will play strategy j 2 S (2) at time t. Let (j; t) = 1 if player 2 plays their
j -th strategy in round t and zero otherwise. Denote by N (p; t) the number
of rounds up to the t-th round that f generated a vector of forecasts equal
to p. Let (p; j; t) be the fraction of these rounds for which player 2 plays j ,
i.e.,
t
X
(p; j; t) = If (sN)=(pp;(tj;) s) ;
s=1
if N (p; t) > 0 and zero otherwise.
The forecast f is said to calibrated with respect to the sequences of plays
made by player 2 if:
X
N (p; t) = 0
j

(
p;
j;
t
)
?
p
j
lim
j
t!1 p
t
2

Dawid (1982) page 605. His notation has been changed to match ours.
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for all j 2 S (2). Notice that taking 0=0 = 0 is now seen not to matter since
the only time it will occur is if N (p; t) = 0, and thus it would be multiplied
by zero anyway. Roughly, calibration says that the empirical frequencies
conditioned on the assessments converge to the assessments. This is to be
contrasted with the asymptotic myopic bayes condition of Fudenberg and
Kreps which says that the empirical frequencies in round t converge together
with the assessments in round t.

3 Calibration and Correlated Equilibrium
It is clear from the de nition of correlated strategies that a CE is simply
a joint distribution over S (1)  S (2) with a particular property. Hence, we
focus on Dt (x; y), the fraction of times up to time t that player 1 plays x
and player 2 plays y. This is the empirical joint distribution. We assume
that when players select their best response (for a given forecast) they use
a a stationary and deterministic tie breaking rule; say the lowest indexed
strategy.

Theorem 1 Let  be the set of all correlated equilibria. If each player uses

a forecast that is calibrated against the others sequence of plays, and then
makes a best response to this forecast, then,

min
max jD (x; y) ? D(x; y)j ! 0
D2 x2S (1);y2S (2) t

as t, the number of rounds of play, tends to in nity.

PROOF: Observe rst that the nm-tuple each of whose components is
of the form Dt(x; y) lies in the nm ? 1 dimensional unit simplex. By the
8

Bolzano-Weirstrass theorem any bounded sequence in it contains a convergent subsequence. Thus, for any subsequence fDti (x; y)g and D(x; y) such
that
X
jDti (x; y) ? D(x; y)j ! 0;
x2S(1)
y2S(2)

we need to show that D is a CE.
For each x 2 S (1) let Mb(x) be the set of mixtures over S (2) for which x
is a best response. Mb(x) is a closed convex subset of the n ? 1 dimensional
simplex. Let Mp(x) be the set of mixtures where player 1 actually plays x
given that the forecast is in Mp(x). By the assumption that players choose
best responses, Mp(x)  Mb(x). Further, fMp(x) : x 2 S (1)g forms a
partition of the simplex. The empirical conditional distribution of y 2 S (2)
)
P D(x;y)
given that player 1 played x is Pc2DSti (x;y
Dti (x;c) . This converges to c2S D(x;c)
as long as Pc2S(2) Dti (x; c) does not converge to zero. If it did, it would mean
that the proportion of times that x is played tends to zero. Hence, in the
limit, player 1 never plays x, so it can be ignored. To complete the proof
it suces to show that the n-tuple whose y-th component is Pc2DS (x;yD)(x;c) is
contained in Mb(x). Observe that:
(2)

(2)

(2)

Dti (x; y) = t?i 1
=
=
=

X

(y; r)

rti :f (r)2Mp(x)
X
X
?
1
ti
(y; r)
p2Mp(x) rti :f (r)=p
X
?
1
ti
(p; y; ti)N (p; ti)
p2Mp(x)
X
t?i 1
py N (p; ti) +
p2Mp(x)
X
+ t?i 1
((p; y; ti) ? py )N (p; ti)
p2Mp(x)
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Since the forecasts being used are calibrated, the second term in the last
expression goes to zero as t tends to in nity. Note:
X
py PN (p; ti) 2 Mb (x)
N (q; ti)
p2Mp (x)
q2Mp (x)

because it is a convex combination of vectors in Mb (x) f recall, Mp  Mbg,
and Mb(x) is convex. Therefore
D(x; y) = lim X p XN (p; t)
P
y
N (p; t)
c2S (2) D(x; c) ti !1 p2Mp(x)
p2Mp(x)

which is then the yth component of a vector in Mb (x) also.
We have shown that any sequence fDti (x; y)g contains a convergent subsequence whose limit is a CE. The theorem now follows.
2
In some sense the result above is not surprising. We know from Milgrom
and Roberts (1991) if players use best responses they eliminate dominated
strategies. Secondly, the calibration requirement forces limit points to satisfy
an additional equilibrium requirement. Correlation arises because players are
able to condition on previous plays.
It is natural to ask if Theorem 1 would hold with a non-stationary tiebreaking rule. The following version of matching pennies shows that this is
not possible. In each round the row player will forecast that there is a 50%
Matching Pennies
h
t
H 1n-1 -1n1
T -1n1 1n-1
chance that column will play heads and a 50% chance that column will play
10

tails, i.e., (0.5, 0.5) is the forecast. The column player will do likewise. Given
these forecasts there is a tie for the best reply. Consider the following tie
breaking rule: on even numbered rounds play heads and tails on the other
rounds. Notice that the resulting sequence of plays will be: Tt, Hh, Tt, Hh,
: : :. Clearly the forecasts of each player are calibrated, but the distribution
of plays does not converge to a CE.
Theorem 1 raises the question of how a calibrated forecast is to be produced. Oakes (1985), has shown that there is no deterministic forecast that is
calibrated for all possible sequences of outcomes. Our requirements are more
modest. Given a game, and a correlated equilibrium of this game, is there
a sequence of plays and a deterministic forecasting rule depending only on
observed histories that is calibrated? The next theorem provides a positive
answer to this question.

De nition: Call a point of the distribution D(x; y) a limit point of calibrated forecasts if there exist deterministic best reply functions Ri () and

calibrated forecasting rules pi such that if each player i, plays Ri (pi ), then the
limiting joint distribution will be D(x; y).

De nition: Let  be the set of all distributions which are limit points of
calibrated forecasts.

Using this notation we can restate Theorem 1 as saying that   .
We can represent every game by a vector in <2mn, where each component
corresponds to a players payo . A set of games is of measure zero if the
corresponding set of points in <2mn has Lebesgue measure zero.
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Theorem 2 For almost every game (G) = (G). In other words, for al-

most every game, the set of distributions which calibrated learning rules can
converge to is identical to the set of correlated equilibriums.

Proof: Because of Theorem 1 we need only prove that   . Let

(xj ; yj ) be a deterministic computable sequence such that the limiting joint
distribution is D(x; y). At time j , have player 1 forecast

p1;j () = D(xj ; )
and player two forecast

p2;j () = D(; yj )

,

,

X

y2S (2)

X

x2S (1)

D(xj ; y)

D(xj ; y) :

By the assumption that the joint distribution converges to D(x; y), it is clear
that both of these forecasts are calibrated. Further, xj is in fact a best
response to the forecast p1;j (), and yj to p2;j (). So, de ne R1(p) such that
for all j , xj = R1(p1;j ) and similarly for R2(p). These forecasts and these
best reply functions are the key idea of the proof. In fact, in the situation
where R1() and R2() are both well de ned we have completed the proof.
But, R1() and R2() might not be well de ned. In other words, there
might be two di erent strategies x0 and x00 such that xj0 = x0 and xj00 = x00,
then p1;j0 () = p1;j00 () = p. This is where the \almost every game" condition
comes into play.
Almost every game has the property that all the sets Mb(x) have nonempty interior. To see why this is the case, observe that Mb (x) is formed by
the intersection of half-spaces. Start with a closed convex set with non-empty
interior, C , say and add these half-spaces one at a time. We can choose C
12

to be the simplex of all mixed strategies. Consider a half-space H , chosen at
random such that the coecients that de ne H are continuous with respect
to lebesgue measure. We claim that the intersection of C and H is either the
empty set, or a set with an open interior.
Pick a point p in the interior of C . Let q be the point in the boundary of H
which is closest to p. Let v be the ray from p to q and d its length. Both v and
d have continuous distributions since they are a continuous transformation of
the half-space H . Now consider distribution of d conditional on v. Given v
there is a unique d such that H will be tangent to C and not contain C . The
conditional probability of d taking this value is 0. Hence the unconditional
probability is zero also.
The interiors of the sets of the form Mb(x) are disjoint. 3 Thus, near the
point p there are points px0 and px00 such that the unique best response to
px0 is x0 and the unique best response to px00 is x00. Forecasting px0 or px00
instead of p makes the reply function well de ned. Unfortunately, when the
forecast of px0 is made, the actual frequency will turn out to be p. Thus,
the calibration score will be o by at most jpx0 ? pj. If we can choose px0 to
be convergent to p solves this last problem and our proof is complete.
De ne a sequence pxi 0 = (1 ? 1=i)p + (1=i)px0 . Then pxi 0 converges to
p and for all i, pxi 0 has x0 as its unique best reply. For each i forecast pxi 0
suciently many times to ensure that there is a high probability that the
empirical distribution is within 1=i of p. With high probability the empirical
frequency conditional on forecast pxi 0 will be within 2=i of pxi 0 and hence the
calibration score will converge to zero.
2
3

The interiors and the union of the boundaries would form a partition.
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To see why theorem 2 only holds for almost every game and not every
game, consider the following game:
Example of  6= 
1

2 3
A 2n2 0n3 0n1
B 2n2 0n1 0n3
C 2n0 1n1 1n0
If ROW randomizes between A and B (with equal probability) and COL
plays 1, then this is a Correlated Equilibrium with a payo of (2,2). But, the
only point in  is the distribution which puts all its weight on point (C,2)
which yields a payo of (1,1). This is because: Mb (A) = Mb(B ) = f(1; 0; 0)g
and Mb(c) is the entire simplex. So, if RROW((1; 0; 0)) = A, then ROW will
never play strategy B, and likewise if RROW((1; 0; 0)) = B , then ROW will
never play A. So, a mixture of A and B is impossible and thus the payo
(2,2) is impossible. Thus,  6= .
Can Theorem 1 be strengthened such that convergence to Nash Equilibrium is assured instead of to a CE? The previous theorem shows if one
assumes only calibration, one gets any CE in . So, without further assumptions on the forecasting rule, convergence to Nash cannot be assured. In
particular by adding an assumption that the limit exists does not re ne the
equilibrium attained (in contrast with Fudenberg and Kreps who show that
if a limit exists, it must be Nash). This is because Theorem 2 does not just
nd an accumulation point it nds a direct limit.
Is it easy to construct a forecast that is calibrated? Given the impossibility theorem of Oakes (1985) the existence of a deterministic scheme that is
calibrated for all sequences is ruled out. However, a randomized forecasting
14

scheme is possible.

Theorem 3 ( Foster and Vohra 1991) There exists a randomized fore-

cast that player 1 can use such that no matter what learning rule player 2
uses, player 1 will be calibrated. That is to say, player 10 s calibration score
X X
(1)
Ct 
j(p; j; t) ? pj j N (p; t)

t

p j 2S (2)

converges to zero in probability. In other words, for all 00 we have that
lim P (Ct < ) = 1:
t!1

Proof: See the appendix.

The important thing to notice about Theorem 3 is that each player can
individually choose to be calibrated. The other player can not foil this choice.
Player 1 does not have to assume that player 2 is using an exchangeable
sequence, nor that the player 2 is rational. Player 1 is still calibrated if
player 2 plays any arbitrary sequence. Secondly, the proof is constructive,
i.e., there is an explicit algorithm for producing such a forecast.4 To extend
this result to the n-person case the forecasting rules must predict the joint
distribution of what everyone else will play.
If in Theorem 1 we require only that the players use a forecasting rule
that is close to calibrated in the sense of Theorem 3, we obtain:

Corollary There exists a randomized forecasting scheme, such that if both
player 1 and player 2 follow this scheme, then FOR ANY normal form matrix
game and for all  > 0, there exists a t0 > 0, such that for all t > t0 ,

P (min
max jDt(x; y) ? D(x; y)j < ) > 1 ? :
D2 x;y
4

The most involved step is inverting a matrix.
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In other words, Dt converges in probability to the set  under the Hausdor
topology.

4 The Shapley Game and Fictitious Play
The most famous of learning rules for games is called Fictitious Play (FP),
rst conceived in 1949 by George Brown. In a two person game it goes as
follows:

De nition: De nition of Fictitious Play: Row computes the proportion of

times up to the present that Column has played each of his/her strategies.
Then, Row treats these proportions as the probabilities that Column will select
from among his/her strategies. Row then selects the strategy that is his/her
best response. Column does likewise.

In 1951 Julia Robinson proved that FP converges to a NE in 2 person
zero sum games.
After the Robinson paper, interest naturally turned to trying to generalize
Robinson's theorem to non-zero sum games. In 1961, K. Miyasawa proved
that FP converges to a NE in 2-person non-zero sum games where each player
has at most two strategies.5 However, in 1964 Lloyd Shapley dashed hopes
of a generalization by describing a non-zero sum game consisting of three
strategies for each player in which FP did not converge to a NE. In this
section we show that FP doesn't converge to a Correlated Equilibrium. We
use Shapley's original example:
5

See Monderer and Shapley (1993) for other situations in which FP converges.
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Payo Matrix for Shapley Game
1

2

3

1 1n0 0n1 0n0
2 0n0 1n0 0n1
3 0n1 0n0 1n0
As observed by Shapley, FP in this game will oscillate between 6 states,
(1,1) then (1,2), then (2; 2); (2; 3); (3; 3); (3; 1), then repeat. Fictitious play
stays longer and longer in each state, so the periods of oscillation get larger
and larger. There is only one Correlated equilibrium with support on these
six states.6 It assigns probability 1=6 to each state. Fictitious play is never
close to this distribution.7 Thus, it does not converge to a CE.
6

Using Nau and McCardle (1990) the following linear program produces all the CE.
p11

 p12  p22  p23  p33  p31  p11;
p13

 p11; p13  p23;

p21

 p22; p21  p31;

p32

 p33; p32  p12:

Which is equivalent to the : 11 = 12 = 22 = 23 = 33 = 31 = 11 13  11 21 
11 32  11. Adding the constraint that 13 = 21 = 32 = 0, this LP has a unique
solution of 11 = 12 = 22 = 23 = 33 = 31 = 1 6.
7 This can be see either by direct calculation, or by the following trick. If Fictitious play
was ever close to this CE, then the marginals would have to be close to (1 3 1 3 1 3).
But, these marginals correspond to the Nash Equilibrium. Shapley created this example
precisely to show that the marginals didn't converge to the marginals of the Nash equilibrium, in fact the marginals are bounded away from the (1 3 1 3 1 3) point. Thus the
Nash equilibrium is not an accumulation point of the sequence of plays. Thus, we know
that the marginals are never close to being correct, and thus the joint distribution is also
never close.
LP

p

;p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

;p

p

;p

p

=

= ;

= ;
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= ;

=

= ;

=

The Shapley game is interesting because it has a CE which is not a
mixture of Nash Equilibriums. 8 Theorem 3 tells us that there are calibrated
learning rules which will then converge to this CE. The expected payo is
(1=2; 1=2) which Pareto dominates the Nash payo of (1=3; 1=3).

Postscript
Earlier versions of this paper as well as presentations of the results at various
conferences have generated a deal of follow on papers on calibration and its
connections to game theory. In this section, we give a brief description of
some of this work.
Theorem 3, which establishes the existence of randomized forecasting
scheme that is calibrated has prompted a number of alternative proofs. The
rst of these was due to Sergiu Hart (personal communication) and is particularly simple and short. It makes use of the mini-max theorem. The draw
back is that the scheme implied by the method is impractical to implement.
Independently, Fudenberg and Levine (1995) also gave a proof using the minimax theorem. The approach is more elaborate than Hart's but produces a
forecasting scheme that is practical to implement. In a follow up paper Fudenberg and Levine [1996] consider a re nement of the calibration idea that
involves the classi cation of observations into various categories. For this
re nement they derive a procedure that yields almost as high a time-average
payo as could be obtained if the player chooses knowing the conditional
distribution of actions given categories. If players use such a procedure, long
run the time average play resembeles a correlated equilibrium.
The unique Nash Equilibrium for this game is (1 3 1 3 1 3) vs (1 3 1 3 1 3). So,
any CE which isn't Nash, is also not a mixture of Nash Equilibriums.
8

= ;
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= ;

=

= ;

= ;

=

Our own proof of Theorem 3 (which is described in the appendix) is based
on establishing the existence of a forecasting scheme that has a property
called no-regret. An proof along the lines of Theorem 1 shows that a noregret procedure would also lead to a correlated equilibrium. Hart and MasCollel (1996) have extended this idea in many ways. First they proved a
very elegant proof of no-regret based on Blackwell's (195?) vector mini-max
theorem. Second they modify this scheme which requires a matrix inversion
to one that involves regret-matching. This greatly reduces the computations
required to implement the procedure. The simpli ed procedure no longer
has the no-regret property but it will converge to a correlated equilibrium.
Their theorem is much harder to prove since they can't simply appeal to a
no-regret/calibration property as we have done.
Kalai, Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1996) have recently shown that the notion of calibration is mathematically equivalent to that of merging. This
allows one to establish relationships between convergence results based on
merging and those based on calibration and so derive some new convergence
results.

Appendix
This appendix provides a telegraphic proof of Theorem 3. For more details
see Foster and Vohra (1991).
We will rst prove a property called \no-regret." Consider k forecasts
each with a loss or penalty at time t of 0  Lit  1 for i = 1; : : : ; k. Now consider a randomized forecast which picks forecast i at time t with probability
wti. We de ne the loss from using the combined forecast to be the weighted
sum of the losses of each forecast, namely, Pki=1 wtiLit.
19

De nition: The regret generated by changing all i forecasts to j forecasts
is RiT!j  maxf0; STij g = STij ISTij >0 where Ix>0 is the indicator function and
STij 

T
X
wti (Lit ? Ljt ):
t=1

We choose the probability vector wt so that it satis es the following ow
conservation equations:
k
X
i
wt Rit!?1j
j =1

(8i)

k
X
= wtj Rtj?!1i :
j =1

The duality theorem of linear programming can be used to establish the
existence of a non-negative solution wt to this system such that Pki=1 wti = 1.

Lemma 1 (No-regret) For pall i and j  the regret grows as the squareroot
 
of T . In particular, RTi !j  2kT .
Proof: Let G(x)  x2 Ix>0. Since x  21 + G (x) we see that
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RTi !j  21 + G (STi j )  21 + G(STij )
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Now G0 (x) = xIx>0 and so
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(Stij ? Stij?1)G0 (Stij?1) =
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wt(Lt ? Ljt )(Stij?1IStij?1>0)
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= 0 by ow conservation

= 0

Expanding G (Stij ) as a two term Taylor series around Stij?1 shows
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G (Stij ) 

X

ij

X

X
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G (Stij?1) + (Stij ? Stij?1)G0(Stij?1) + (wti )2(Lit ? Ljt )2
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X
ij

X

G (Stij?1) + k (wti)2
G (Stij?1) + k:

i

Computing the recursive sum we see that Pij G(STij )  Tk and so RTi !j 
p
p
1 + Tk. Picking  = 1= 2kT shows Ri !j   2Tk .
2
T
2
We will now show that for a suitable loss function, a randomized forecast
that has no regret must also be calibrated.

 First, our forecasting scheme will choose in each round a probability
vector from the set fpiji = 0; 1; : : : ; kg which is chosen so that any
probability distribution over S(2) (the opponents strategies) is within
 of one of these points.

 We denote the move made by player in 2 by the vector Xt = [Xt;1; Xt;2; Xt;3; : : :]
where Xt;j = 1 if strategy j 2 S (2) was chosen and zero otherwise. Notice that Xt will be a 0-1 vector with exactly on non-zero component.

 Next, the loss incurred in round t from forecasting pi will be Lit =
jXt ? pij2 = Pj2S(2) jXt;j ? pij j2.
 The probability of forecasting pi at time t will be wti .
We would like to choose the wt's so that L-2 calibration C2(t) goes to zero
in probability as t gets large, where
X
t)
C2(t) = ((p; j; t) ? pj )2 N (p;
t
p
The expected value of C2(t) is given by:

E (C2(t)) =

k X
t X
X
s=1 i=1 j 2S (2)

wti(t(pi ; j; s) ? pij )2=s:
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Simple algebra yields
X

i

max
Rit!j =t  E (C2(t))   +
j

X

i

max
Rit!j =t
j

If the probabilities wt's are chosen to satisfy the ow conservation equations
displayed earlier, we deduce that
E (C2(t))   + O( pk ):
t
Thus if we let k grow slowly and  go slowly to zero, we see that C2(t) ! 0
in expectation which implies C2(t) ! 0 in probability by Jensen's inequality.
The L-1 calibration de nition of equation (1) follows from the fact that it
is smaller than the square root of the L-2 calibration. Thus we have proved
Theorem 3.
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